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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Differences Between Genders: A New Outlook 
Several years ago, in an attempt to explain the quantitative gap that ex-
ists between men and women on university science faculties, Professor 
Lawrence Summers proclaimed that there are fewer women than men on 
science and math faculties because men and women have different abilities 
in these fields.
1
  A month later, addressing his comments on women and the 
sciences, Summers added that the absence of women in scientific fields 
arises from present social failings that ought to be corrected.
2
 
Summers‘s explanation of the alleged innate differences between men 
and women reflects the prevailing opinion on the absence of women in 
scientific fields and the deficit of women inventors.
3
  The widely held con-
tention posits that there are inborn biological differences between men and 
women; women possess more advanced verbal skills and men possess bet-
ter mathematical and spatial capabilities (known as the difference claim).
4
  
                                                          
 1. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Why Women Are Poor at Science, by Harvard Presi-
dent, THE GUARDIAN (London) (Jan. 18, 2005, 12:14 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2005/jan/18/educationsgendergap.genderissues (re-
porting that Professor Summers intended to stimulate discussion at a conference when 
he stated that innate differences between men and women might be one reason that 
fewer women succeed in science and math careers, and offered three explanations for 
the lack of women in senior positions in science and engineering: (i) a lack of desire to 
work long hours because of their responsibilities for their children; (ii) innate differ-
ences between males and females; and (iii) the influence of gender discrimination on 
academic appointments); see also Lawrence H. Summers, Letter from President Sum-
mers on Women and Science, HARVARD UNIV. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 19, 
2005), http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/summers_2005/womensci.php (apo-
logizing for not having weighed his comments more carefully after receiving negative 
media responses to his comments). 
 2. See Lawrence H. Summers, Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the 
Science & Engineering Workforce, HARVARD UNIV. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 14, 
2005), http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php (explaining 
that discrimination and the lack of education are responsible for the scarcity of women 
working in science). 
 3. See Steven Pinker, The Science of Difference, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE 
(Feb. 14, 2005), http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/2005_02_14_newrepublic 
.html (stating that Summers‘s analysis of why there are fewer women in the sciences is 
commonplace amongst economists who study gender disparities). 
 4. See Doreen Kimura, Sex Differences in the Brain, SCI. AM. (May 13, 2002), 
available at http://www.changelingaspects.com/Articles/Sex Differences in the Brain - 
Scientific American.htm (adding that recent empirical studies suggest that the effects of 
sex hormones on brain organization occur so early in life that evaluating the effect of 
experience and enjoyment is even more difficult than previously understood); see also 
ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & CAROL N. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 
2
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According to this contention, people would expect only a small minority of 
women to be inventors; thus, the segregation between women and men in 
the field of technological-industrial invention is neither coincidental nor the 
intentional result of a particular legal structure, but instead the natural con-
sequence of such alleged innate differences.  Research examining the dif-
ferences between men and women, reported in psychological literature, 
supports this opinion.
5
  Incorporated into this widely held contention is the 
assumption that even if legal structures facilitated or encouraged women to 
own patents, women would remain the minority patent-holders because of 
their innate differences.  Adoption of this explanation precludes any reason 
or incentive to change the social and legal structures for acquiring patents 
in a way that would grant women more rights because, under the difference 
claim, the result would inextricably remain the same. 
The discussion contained in this Article does not deal with the accuracy 
of the biological claim that asserts the existence of ―differences‖ between 
genders.  Rather, the focus is to bring attention to and open channels of dis-
course regarding the state of gender inequality within the patent field by 
analyzing the approaches of various feminist theories to the ―differences‖ 
between the genders.  It will also demonstrate how the current legal me-
chanisms, as applied in practice, use these differences to maintain the status 
quo and restrict women from becoming ―inventors.‖6 
In this introductory section, two general feminist approaches to the claim 
of gender differences set the stage for a later discussion of the intersection 
between gender and patent law.  This discussion is followed by a summary 
of the contents of the study embodied in this Article, the current findings of 
related research, and the significance of such findings. 
In contrast to Professor Summers‘s viewpoint, Radical Feminism, the 
first of the gender theories discussed, does not accept the paradigm of 
gender ―differences,‖ claiming it is a suppressive explanation meant to in-
fuse the world with security and certainty regarding the status quo of tradi-
                                                          
351-52 (1974) (listing numerous areas where there has been insufficient empirical re-
search or ambiguous findings comparing men and women such as studies assessing 
competitiveness, dominance, compliance, and fear timidity and anxiety in children); 
LEONARD SAX, WHY GENDER MATTERS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS NEED TO 
KNOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 77-114 (2005) (finding 
that there are biological differences in the ways boys and girls learn and that separate 
groups make different learning styles possible). 
 5. See DAVID WECHSLER, THE MEASUREMENT AND APPRAISAL OF ADULT 
INTELLIGENCE 148 (4th ed. 1958) (explaining that males do better than females in 
arithmetic and picture completions and females do better than males in vocabulary on 
intelligence tests). 
 6. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimi-
nation (1984), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 35 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, Dif-
ference and Dominance] (arguing that law of sex discrimination actually asks to hold 
women to a male standard, thus defeating its purpose of treating women as equals). 
3
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tional gender roles.
7
  Because the differences claim is premised upon natu-
ral-inborn characteristics, it precludes criticism and change of the status 
quo.
8
 
Professor Catherine MacKinnon emphasizes that the relevant question is 
not about the ―differences‖ between the sexes, but rather the ―distribution 
of power‖ in accordance to those alleged differences.9  Following the dis-
tributive reasoning, the current practice of determining the criteria of Eligi-
ble Patent Matters (EPM), which determines what is considered a protected 
patent, is, as this Article claims, in accordance with androcentric characte-
ristics, and is therefore neither biological nor evolutionary, but purely polit-
ical and consequently serves to influence the unequal distribution of rights 
and resources in society.
10
  As such, while the actual existence of real dif-
ferences between men and women remains unknown, the fact remains that 
the female voice is silenced, regardless of whether it is by actual innate dif-
ferences or imagined ones.
11
  If genuine female traits exist, they can only 
be expressed where there is no fear under conditions of freedom, autono-
my, and equality, conditions that fail to exist today.  At that point, it will be 
possible to examine the laws of invention in a more egalitarian manner.  
Until then, according to Radical Feminist theory, the widespread perspec-
tive of ―gender as difference‖ merely utilizes gender as an exclusory me-
chanism stunting the growth of women in general and, for the purposes of 
this discussion, as inventors.  When acknowledging such circumstances, 
the relevant and practical question then becomes, how can women gain 
access to those benefits from which they were excluded? 
On the other hand, cultural feminism accepts the contention that there 
are differences between the sexes, and it praises women‘s differences.12 
                                                          
 7. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not by Law Alone: From a Debate with Phyl-
lis Schlafly, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED  21, 22 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, Not by 
Law Alone] (arguing that differentiation is a strategy to suppress women, while real 
feminism seeks to empower women on their own terms). 
 8. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
249 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY] (finding that most 
people have a natural tendency to find the logic for existing ―rules‖ and to justify them, 
which creates a sense of certainty and reduces the anxiety of the unknown but also pa-
ralyzes criticism and change). 
 9. See MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, supra note 6, at 34 (arguing that 
difference between men and women created their division but men dominated to the 
point where women are measured according to their lack of correspondence with men). 
 10. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: To-
ward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC‘Y 635, 638-39 
(1983) (claiming that male dominance is the most pervasive power in history because 
its point of view is the standard). 
 11. See MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, supra note 6, at 44-45 (arguing 
that as long as women‘s voices are not heard and sex equality is limited by sex differ-
ence, women cannot achieve true equality). 
 12. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMAN‘S DEVELOPMENT 6 (1982) (arguing that to understand human development, we 
4
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Professor Carol Gilligan describes some of those differences, including tra-
ditionally—attributed ―female‖ traits that emphasize support for relation-
ships and traditionally—attributed ―male‖ traits that emphasize hierarchy 
and power.  The differences attributed to women, according to Gilligan‘s 
claim, are neither objective nor neutral because, when viewed critically, 
general rules, standards and norms emerge as measures created and calcu-
lated according to male traits.
13
  Any differences possessed by women, 
therefore, automatically became exceptions to the norm and being an ex-
ception or different has, over time, acquired the meaning of inferiority.  
The result is that ―male‖ traits act as discriminative tools disguised as legi-
timate criteria used to exclude women from receiving the same benefits as 
the standard (male).
14
 
Both feminist approaches agree that questioning the differences between 
the genders (especially the claim of biological origins) is not necessary to 
the gender bias analysis.  Gender difference perpetuates the inferiority of 
women, excludes women from rights, capital, resources and power sources, 
and prevents reform by releasing institutions (and individuals) of any social 
and legal responsibility. 
As applied today, the differences between the genders serve only as 
foundational criteria for a discriminatory definition in the context of defin-
ing the benefits and protections of patent law and for distributing those 
benefits between the genders.  As a result of the way that the difference 
claim is used, rather than the difference itself, the definitions of ―invention‖ 
and ―inventor‖ exclude women from the entitled group of inventors.15  It is 
legal mechanisms of this type that are considered and analyzed in this Ar-
ticle 
Recognition of this exclusionary mechanism is important because it is 
the first step to taking corrective action.  Just as the claim of difference is 
used to exclude women, legal mechanisms can also be used to change the 
resultant discrimination and grant women access to rights and benefits.  
One way to accomplish this can be through expanding relevant definitions 
to entitle more individuals to patent rights, as explained below. 
                                                          
must take into account the female experience). 
 13. See id. at 5-6 (finding that theories formerly seen as neutral actually reflect 
many biases because people are accustomed to seeing life through men‘s eyes). 
 14. See id. at 5 (pointing out that theorists have made the male life the norm and 
women are fashioned out of male cloth). 
 15. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 113-15 (2006) (requiring a drawing, detailed description, 
model if necessary, and oath that inventor ―believes himself is original and first inven-
tor of the process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or improvement 
thereof‖ (emphasis added)). 
5
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B. Gender Analysis of Patent Law: A New Approach 
This Article proposes a novel gender analysis of patent law.  Until now, 
the literature on gender differences and behavioral approaches to science 
has been limited, relating mainly to explaining the gap between men and 
women in acquiring patents from a sociological perspective.  The existing 
body of literature discusses the tendency of women to favor less competi-
tive environments and build more collaborative networks.
16
  Some scholars 
have assessed gender differences in studies comparing men‘s and women‘s 
achievement patenting in science and found that females are less likely to 
patent.
17
  The question that remains is: ―why?‖  This question of ―why?‖ is 
discussed in depth and from a new perspective for the first time below. 
The study embodied in this Article relates to the laws of patents.  At first 
glance, it would seem that intellectual property laws are objective and 
gender-neutral.  Unlike other areas of the law that deal with gender inequa-
lity directly (such as family law or maternity laws), intellectual property 
laws, including the laws relating to patenting inventions, do not, on their 
face, seem to relate to gender.  The legal rules themselves mention neither 
women nor men.  Instead, the exclusion of women from these laws is con-
cealed and has yet to be the subject of focused discussion.  Superficially, 
any woman can invent any invention, register a patent, and earn royalties in 
a manner equal to that of a man in accordance with the law.  The reality, 
however, remains quite different.  Gilligan wrote that ―active adventure is a 
male activity, and that if a woman is to embark on such endeavors, she 
must at least dress like a man.‖18  The basic premise of the discussion in 
this Article is that the law, including patent law, is neither neutral nor ob-
jective.
19
  It should be noted that this criticism of subjectivity is not the sole 
                                                          
 16. See Yu Meng, Women in Patenting: Does Nanotechnology Make a Difference?, 
DRUID-DIME ACAD. 5 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/ 
viewpaper.php?id=500602&cf=44 (discussing that because of these attributes women 
might be more attracted to entering an interdisciplinary field). 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 17 (calling for scholarly intervention to close the gap in gender 
discrimination in the sciences); Waverly W. Ding et al., Gender Differences in Patent-
ing in the Academic Life Science, 313 SCIENCE 665, 665-67 (2006) (finding that women 
faculty members patent at about a rate 40% of the rate of men but that there might not 
be a measurable gender difference to answer why); Ranier Frietsch et al., Gender-
Specific Patterns in Patenting and Publishing, 38 RES. POL‘Y, 590, 594-95 (2009) 
(finding that while there has been a strong increase in women‘s contribution to tecno-
logical output in Spain, France, Denmark, Australia, and the U.S., women‘s contribu-
tions are still relatively low compared to men, explaining that the availability of enter-
ing a specific field in those countries plays a significant role). 
 18. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 13. 
 19. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 133-212 
(1997) (discussing the principle of neutrality); GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: 
PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 20-175 (1997) (evaluating the idea of complete govern-
ment neutrality and arguing that instead of neutrality the government should promote a 
certain idea of ―good‖); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 739, 744 (1982) (claiming that objectivity recognizes a role for the subjective). 
6
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property of feminists: it is a logical and critical schema that has been used 
in the past by other critical legal studies.
20
  Feminism is one part of this 
skeptical tradition, although it does include its own criticisms of the law.
21
  
In this instance, feminist theoreticians stress the claim that the legal prin-
ciples in place can lead to discrimination against women by both creating 
and perpetuating gender gaps.
22
 
Accordingly, the law of invention is neither objective nor neutral but 
contains a built-in gender bias.  This research is premised upon the notion 
that a legal analysis, based on a feminist perspective, will contribute to un-
derstanding the phenomenon of women‘s exclusion from owning intellec-
tual property rights in inventions and patents.  The research addresses Pro-
fessor Wright‘s statement: ―Intellectual property generally is one of the few 
areas of law that seems to have escaped feminist analysis.‖23 
The reader should note that, although understanding the legal issues is 
fundamental to comprehension of the processes that excludes women from 
inventing, a holistic understanding of the phenomena also includes consid-
eration of social and legal factors.  While this Article focuses on one aspect 
of gender discrimination in the context of patent law, the paucity of women 
among the owners of intellectual property rights in inventions and patents 
is complex and should be analyzed from various perspectives.  A proper 
analysis also requires a discussion of both the statistics regarding the num-
ber of women inventors and the problems that arise from the encounter be-
tween women and the workplace.  Each of these discussions has been ex-
plored in separate articles.
24
 
                                                          
 20. See Owen M. Fiss, What is Feminism?, 18 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 5, 14 (1993) 
(describing that objectivity in the law is a product of the public‘s ―false consciousness‖ 
and  serves as a tool for the continued control of the oppressed, making rights the prop-
erty of one group, while denying them to another; and describing the critical legal stu-
dies (CLS) movement that developed in the late 1970s, which applied this critical para-
digm to free-market theory and legal principles in general). 
 21. See MACKINNON, Not by Law Alone, supra note 7, at 26 (arguing the law as 
written has helped women progress very little because it has been a male sphere); 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 8, at 161-62 (stating that the 
law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women). 
 22. See generally Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1279 (1977) (arguing that the differences between males and females are real 
and significant, and that society needs to revalue traditional female occupations as 
equivalent to ―male‖ activities); Joanne Conaghan, Tort Law And Feminist Critique, in 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2003 175 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., vol. 56, 2003) (disagree-
ing with comments made by Professor Gary Schwartz, and arguing that feminist scho-
larship in the area of torts is not thin in substance and narrow in scope, but is richer and 
deeper than first impression). 
 23. See Shelley Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7 
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 59, 64 (1994) (calling for additional research on the presence and 
absence of women within legal protective contexts, particularly in the patent field). 
 24. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Exclusion of Women Inventors from the Meeting 
Point Between Patents as Intellectual Property, Work and Feminine Discourse, in 
STUDIES IN LAW, GENDER AND FEMINISM 357 (Daphne Barak-Erez et al. eds., 2007) 
7
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This Article analyzes the legal structures of patent law and is built upon 
the notion that the other, extra-legal explanations alone are insufficient and 
unable to provide the whole explanation for the exclusion of women inven-
tors.  This Article, for the first time, analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court‘s and 
the international interpretation of the definition of EPM, from the gender 
perspective.  This Article concludes that where the definition of EPM is 
narrow, it does not include ―women‘s life experiences‖ and, therefore, acts 
to exclude women from receiving patents. 
II.  EXCLUSION OF WOMEN INVENTORS BY THE NARROW DEFINITION OF 
A PATENTABLE INVENTION 
A. Eligible Patent Matter (EPM) as a Filtering Factor 
Intellectual property laws provide important sources of access to con-
crete and intellectual assets, capital, rights and power.
25
  Recognition of the 
continued and increasing contribution of intellectual property to innovation 
is well established.  Patent ownership plays an important role acting as an 
incentive for advancement that inevitably leads to economic growth.  As 
such, the number of patent applications and grants has grown significantly 
over recent years, as has the type and breadth of inventions that can be pa-
tented.
26
 
The laws of intellectual property make it possible for applicants and oth-
er people who have access to the patent system to benefit from basic, exis-
tential values including liberty, autonomy, and security while developing 
and actualizing their personhood.
27
  From this point of departure, it is no 
                                                          
(explaining the obstacles preventing entry to positions that might, in the long run, lead 
to developing patents, and the structural conflict between motherhood and work that 
attribute to the low number of woman inventors who own intellectual property in their 
inventions). 
 25. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the 
Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV 239, 257-58 (1994) (defining property 
rights as a system of rules that control access to scarce resources which have the ability 
to satisfy human needs and desires.); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Shaking the Foundations of 
Patentable Subject Matter, Preliminary Discussion Draft, PROGRAM ON INFO. JUSTICE 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. 2 (Apr. 2, 2008), available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/download.cfm?downloadfile=2E900771-B742-
DD30-1B56F85D889A053E&typename=dmFile&fieldname=filename (arguing the 
restriction of some male-dominated inventions, including mathematical algorithms, 
products of nature, and mental processes, impedes the process of technology). 
 26. See, e.g., Wendy H. Schacht, Patent Reform: Issues in the Biomedical and 
Software Industries, 27 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP., 153, 153 (2007) (stating that these 
results show the importance of intellectual property to U.S. innovation and have led to 
Congress‘s interest in reforming the existing system). 
 27. See Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 372-73 (2003) (noting that even the definition of property rights is 
controversial, and presenting a historical survey of the various definitions given for 
property). 
8
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wonder that the laws of property and intellectual property have served as 
the focal point of a philosophical-legal-social debate.  However, intellectual 
property laws have not yet been subject to major feminist analysis.  When 
viewed within the context of gender, the reality reveals that women scien-
tists are less productive than men scientists.  This has a significant and neg-
ative impact on women‘s career advancement by creating and perpetuating 
inequalities in the relevant fields, such as reward and cognition. 
This Article emphasizes the claim that patent law does not provide pro-
tection for all products and processes equally, but only for those products 
or processes that the law itself defines as worthy of protection (resulting in 
the exclusion of women).  In other words, there are built-in legal filters in 
patent law.  One of these accepted ―filters‖ in the field is the principle of 
EPM.  According to this principle, a patentable invention is one that com-
plies with certain criteria, which are established by the law.  Inter alia, 
these include the requirement that the invention be ―new and useful.‖28 
The first argument, described below, illuminates the phenomenon of how 
the use of the narrow definition of a patentable invention acts to exclude 
women.  A comparison is made between the narrow definition of an ―in-
vention‖ that is prevalent in international treaties and the long-standing 
broader U.S. approach. 
Until recently, it was possible to identify at least two principal legal ap-
proaches to defining an invention: (i) the narrow definition, and (ii) the 
broad definition.  The narrow approach is found in the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
29
 and has been 
adopted by many countries, such as Israel.
30
 This definition includes tech-
nological and industrial aspects as threshold conditions for recognizing an 
invention as patentable.  As explained below, this definition, in actual prac-
tice, excludes women as a result of its focus on industrial and technological 
matters. 
                                                          
 28. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (allowing those who invent or discover any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or improvement to 
obtain a patent after meeting the requirements in this title). 
 29. Part II – Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual 
property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ 
t_agm3_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
 30. See Patent Law, 5727-1967 (Isr.) (defining an invention under Israeli law); 
Singapore Patent Act of 1994, Chap. 221, §13 (1) (1995) (defining an invention as 
something that ―[i]s capable of industrial application‖); TAIWAN PATENT LAW, Art. 21 
(2003) (defining an invention as a highly creative technical innovation and the grant of 
the patent for an invention depends whether it ―advances technology significantly 
beyond the state of art at the time of filing‖); Japan Patent Law 121, Art. 2(1) (1999) 
(Japan) (including a reference to the technical application of ideas and defining an in-
vention as ―the highly advanced creation of technical ideas by which a law of nature is 
utilized‖).  See generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
(Dennis Campbell ed., 2009) [hereinafter WORLD IP RIGHTS] (comparing different pa-
tent law legislations from around the world). 
9
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The broad approach is best illustrated by U.S. patent law and its tradi-
tional interpretation of patentable matter, which is not limited by technolo-
gical or industrial requirements, and includes a wider range of inventions.  
The definition adopted by U.S. law is broader than the TRIPS agreement 
definition and, therefore, more accepting of the varied occupations of 
women and their creations. 
Recently, however, and to the detriment of women in the sciences, this 
approach was challenged by U.S. courts on varying levels.  The Supreme 
Court, however, in a traditionalist form, most recently rejected the trend of 
moving lower level U.S. courts toward a narrower approach.
31
  This nar-
rowing trend can be seen, for example, in In re Bilski by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which will be discussed below.
32
  The re-
cent struggle in U.S. courts to abandon the broader approach and adopt the 
narrowing trend is a matter of concern.  As the definition of EPM increases 
its focus on products or processes that contain only mechanical, technical 
and industrial aspects, it becomes more likely that the definition serves to 
exclude women from becoming inventors.  Therefore, these courts‘ deci-
sions need to be addressed from a gender perspective. 
B. The Narrow Approach: The Technological Definition of Invention in the 
TRIPS Agreement 
The most significant international treaties relating to patents have 
adopted the narrow definition of what is a patentable invention, ―patents 
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step 
and are capable of industrial application.‖33 
This definition as it appears in the TRIPS treaty is not atypical or iso-
lated.  For instance, the European Patent Convention (EPC) also takes the 
industrial approach in defining what constitutes an invention: ―European 
patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of indus-
trial application.‖34 
                                                          
 31. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (holding that the Bilski 
Business Methods patent was rejected because of the unpatentability of abstract ideas 
precedents). 
 32. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (ruling that the Bilski 
Business Methods patent was properly rejected using the machine or transfer test pro-
vided by the Supreme Court and clarified by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals). 
 33. See WORLD IP RIGHTS, supra note 30 (emphasis added) (noting that while 
TRIPS, section 27 prohibits discrimination, the prohibition focuses on the place of in-
vention, not the gender of the inventor). 
 34. European Patent Convention, art. 52(1), opened for signature Oct. 5 1973 (en-
tered into force Oct. 7, 1977), available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html#CVN (precluding from the definition of invention; aes-
thetic creations, discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical methods, playing games 
or doing business, computer programs and methods for treating humans and animals). 
10
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These structures and treaties of international intellectual property law are 
centralized and the wording used in international treaties is then translated 
literally into the amended legislation of the various signatory countries.  As 
a consequence, countries that utilize the TRIPS definition adopted similar 
definitions that require a technological application as a prior condition for 
registering a patent and for receiving the protection of patent laws.
35
 
The technological character of an invention has therefore become a cen-
tral element in the question: what is a patentable invention?  As one could 
attest, ―[p]atent law is technology-neutral in theory,‖ but, when taking a 
deeper view – ―it is technology-specific in application.‖36 
Intellectual property rights, in general, and patent law in particular, are 
justified primarily on the foundation of a utilitarian rationale that is ex-
pressed in the U.S. Constitution.
37
  According to this rationale, in order to 
encourage progress in fields that are important to humanity, a social con-
tract is entered into between the public and the inventor.  In this transac-
tion, exclusive rights are granted, for a limited period, to whoever enriches 
the world with innovative intellectual products (or is likely to move the 
process forward).
38
  Intellectual property laws are intended to act as an in-
centive factor for inventors to continue to enrich humanity with new and 
important intellectual products. 
In this respect, many questions may arise regarding the consensus sur-
rounding advancing science in general, and technology and industry in par-
ticular.
39
  Consider these questions: What is science?  Who defines science? 
                                                          
 35. See Patent Law, 5727-1967 (Isrl.) (defining a patentable product as a ―product 
or a process, which is new and useful, can be used in industry or agriculture‖ and in-
cludes  an inventive step which was defined as ―a step which does not, to an average 
skilled person, appear obvious in the light of information published before the applica-
tion date.‖). 
 36. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156, (2002) (explaining that the standards were designed 
to be broad in order to better be able to adapt flexibly to new technologies, and encom-
pass ―anything under the sun made by man‖). 
 37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (―To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖). 
 38. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 36, at 1156 (explaining that while the rules 
were designed at a time when inventions were all mechanical, the Federal Circuit has 
applied those rules in a way that has effectively created different standards for different 
industries); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis 
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325, 344-51 (1989) (describing the nature and 
scope of copyright protections); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely 
Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 495 (2003) (distinguishing expressive 
works, and the marketing thereof analogizing to a record company who is protected by 
copyright laws for all its productions and hence enabled to earn enough money to bal-
ance the risk of developing new, potentially unsuccessful, records and reaping the ben-
efits of the successful records). 
 39. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 36, at 1156 (arguing that a divergence has be-
come apparent between patent rules and their application to different industries). 
11
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What fields are considered part of the definition of science (for instance, is 
social science included)?  What are the results of this definition?  Are tech-
nology and industry the only fields or the primary fields that enhance hu-
man welfare?  Who gains from directing the benefits derived from patent 
law to these particular fields?  Who is excluded by this definition?  Isn‘t the 
contribution of the excluded parties no less significant and important?  
Would the contribution be made without the patent mechanism that pro-
vides monopolistic property rights?  
The discussion below, however, does not focus on the question of 
whether the aim of promoting science, industry and technological ad-
vancement are worthy, but rather, on its gender implication, whether the 
criteria are androcentric and whether the elements of the definition lead to a 
discriminatory outcome, thereby illegitimatizing the criteria.
40
  From the 
perspective of gender, this narrowed definition of a patentable invention 
reflects a ―masculine model.‖  The definition promotes and perpetuates 
characteristics that are attributed primarily to ―male‖ products neither con-
sidering nor legitimatizing the other, differing, ―female voice.‖ 
Scholars attribute women‘s marginalization and exclusion to the ongoing 
dominating masculine epistemology in modern science, and argue that 
science could benefit from integrating women as well as their differing ho-
listic and contextual methodologies.
41
  Some scholars, however, attempt to 
attribute this phenomenon to the influence of stereotypes about capabilities 
and human capital or to gender-related preferences and attitudes towards 
competition.  Indeed, these theories imply that women prefer newly ―un-
crowed‖ or ―feminine‖ niches (where women are concentrated) over, fields 
traditionally dominated by men.  Compared to their male colleagues, wom-
en scientists are thus concentrated in fewer fields, and their inventions are 
limited to these fields.
42
 
Moreover, an additional hurdle exists making it even more difficult for 
those (female) inventors to succeed in fields other than technology and in-
                                                          
 40. See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 
835 (2000) (claiming that overcoming ―simple discrimination‖ is a meta-value and, 
therefore, a principle that is important to keep without considering cost or balancing 
various solutions). 
 41. See Meng, supra note 16, at 3, 5 (noting that women gain only forty percent of 
patents that their male counterparts do and women‘s research approach is inherently 
comprehensive). 
 42. See id. (arguing that traditional disciplines rigidly adhere to the problems and 
methods defined by male authorities); see also Diana Rhoten & Stephanie Pfirman, 
Women in Interdisciplinary Science: Exploring Preferences and Consequences, 36 
RESEARCH POLICY 56, 59 (2007) (analyzing theories explaining why women are more 
drawn to interdisciplinary research than their male counterparts); Elizabeth Bird, Dis-
ciplining the Interdisciplinary: Radicalism and the Academic Curriculum, 32 BRIT. J. 
SOC. EDUC.  463, 464 (2001) (describing the role and growth of women‘s participation 
in interdisciplinary studies and noting its steady decline and commenting that women 
may no longer be the minority in colleges and universities). 
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dustry.  The burden of proving that inventions in fields other than technol-
ogy and industry comply with the legal definition of an invention lies on 
the inventor, and in such ―alternative‖ fields, this proof is neither assured 
nor simple. 
Considering the above, it appears that, according to the international de-
finition, the law regarding patents is intended to facilitate inventions of a 
technological or industrial nature and offer them better protection over oth-
er inventions.  By adding the technological requirement as a condition for 
approving a patent, when it is well-known that there are huge gaps between 
men and women in these fields and without paying proper attention to the 
inevitable outcomes of enforcing this definition—the flagrant exclusion of 
women inventors—the definition of EPM becomes clearly problematic in 
the field of gender relations. 
C. The Expansive Approach in the U.S. Law: New and Useful Process vs. 
Machine Test 
The United States, in contrast to the widely held international approach, 
has explicitly opposed the definition set forth in TRIPS and has historically 
insisted instead on a broader approach in law.
43
  This approach, in place to-
day, supports a broad definition of the EPM and is anchored in both law 
and precedent.
44
 
35 U.S.C. 101 Inventions patentable. 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process  
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the condi-
tions and requirements of this title.
45
  
A plain text reading reveals that the definition of ―inventions patentable‖ 
includes neither ―in all fields of technology‖ nor ―industrial applications‖ 
as a threshold criteria.
46
 
The language of the law reflects an attitude that emerged from the U.S. 
Constitution, which states that the exclusive protection granted to inventors 
is intended, ―to promote the progress of science and useful arts:‖ 
U.S. Constitution, Art I § 8: 
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for li-
mited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respec-
                                                          
 43. See Vincent Chiappetta, TRIP-ping Over Business Method Patents, 37 VAND. 
J.TRANSNAT‘L L. 181, 182 (2004) (noting that the United States has been expanding its 
definition of patents and has added business methods to its patentable inventions defi-
nition). 
 44. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 45. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 46. See Chiappetta, supra note 43, at 184 (arguing the additions to the areas cov-
ered under patentable inventions is imprecise and subject to heated debate). 
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tive writings and discoveries.
47
 
The constitution does not claim that ―science and useful arts‖ must have 
a technological or industrial aspect.  Promoting human welfare and 
progress can instead find expression in broader areas, including the less 
technical areas of education and business. 
The crowning glory of broadly defining inventions has been the U.S. 
courts‘ recognition of patent protection for ―Business Methods.‖48  These 
broad encompassing rulings have resulted in a substantial expansion of the 
U.S. patent system and a lessening of its self-limitation to the technical ap-
plications only. 
It should be stressed that this broad interpretation of the law in the Unit-
ed States, even if not intended to improve the number of women inventors 
and despite being subject to criticism,
49
 inadvertently may serve to contri-
bute to increasing the number of women inventors and may be moving to-
ward the important goal of narrowing the gender gap in patent law.  This 
will be especially true if the definition is expanded to include other equali-
ty-promoting interpretations, as proposed below, like endorsing female life 
experience products and methods as patentable. 
In this way, U.S. law is distinguished by its broad and flexible interpreta-
tion of what is considered EPM, like its less conspicuous emphasis on the 
technology and the absence of a list of social exceptions.
50
  By embracing a 
broader definition, the U.S. legal system affords greater protection to the 
female life experience, avoids limiting protection to only male inventions, 
and results in an increased number of women inventors. 
                                                          
 47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 48. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228-29 (2010) (rejecting the Bilski Business Methods 
application as unpatentabile because it was an abstract idea and emphasizing, once 
again, the adoption of the broad approach by stating that the statute acknowledges that 
there may be a business methods patent); see also State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the recogni-
tion of Business Methods as patentable). 
 49. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad 
For Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000) (regarding 
business method patents); Chiappetta, supra note 43, at 192 (arguing that the competi-
tive arts do not benefit from the patent model); Andre J. Porter, Should Business Me-
thod Patents Continue to Be Patentable?, 29 S.U. L. REV. 225, 225 (2002) (discussing 
the rising importance of business methods patents since the advent of the internet); 
Brian P. Biddinger, Limiting the Business Method Patent: A Comparison and Proposed 
Alignment of European, Japanese and United States Patent Law, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2523, 2524 (2001) (pointing out that how technology is defined has become an increa-
singly difficult problem). 
 50. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining inventions patentable as ―[w]hoever in-
vents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the 
conditions and requirement of this title‖); see also R. CARL MOY, MOY‘S WALKER ON 
PATENTS § 5:4 (4th ed. 2010) (describing that the statute is likely the foundation for the 
broader interpretation of ―invention‖). 
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This broader approach is illustrated by the recognition that the U.S. sys-
tem of patent law has historically given credit to inventions originating in 
occupations where women have been more dominant and fields where 
women traditionally were and are more likely to contribute to increasing 
the general welfare.  Take for example, a pediatric speech therapist that 
wants to benefit from patent law protection for a diagnostic method that she 
invented.  According to the narrow approach, in order for her invention to 
merit protection, the invention requires a technological anchor, such as a 
computer-based tool.  Under the narrow approach, this invention might not 
be entitled to the protection of patent law and is unlikely to benefit from 
any other protection.
51
  Conversely, under the broader interpretation a non-
technological invention, such as a speech therapy diagnostic tool, may be 
recognized as patentable.
52
 
The fields wherein women tend to contribute to human welfare are those 
in which women are dominant, active, and creative.  For example, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has identified a new field 
of ―social inventions,‖ as a field that benefits from women‘s work.53  A 
―social invention‖ is a new imaginative solution to social problems or to 
unsatisfied social needs, such as a new method to improve the quality of 
life or a new organizational structure. 
Another example presents itself when women, as educators, develop me-
thods or tools for improving teaching and learning abilities or as psycholo-
gists create diagnostic techniques.  Assuming that therapeutic methods are 
not an exception, the broad approach, unlike the narrow one, is likely to 
recognize these innovations and thereby protect inventions that reflect the 
activities where women are currently dominant.
54
  Therapeutic and educa-
tional methods under the narrow approach, however, are not adequately 
protected.  There is no doubt that it is less difficult, in actual practice, to 
obtain patent protection for such developments if the invention is related to 
a technological application.
55
 
                                                          
 51. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 52. See DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2-26 (1996) (noting that the U.S. Patent office indicated 
that therapeutic-medical treatment methods are patentable if they meet the process and 
the conditions of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness). 
 53. See William Hartston, The Institute for Social Inventions: Feeling Lucky, 
Punk?, THE INDEPENDENT (London) March 10, 1994, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/the-institute-for-social-inventions-
feeling-lucky-punk-1428142.html (describing the results and general application for the 
field of social inventions). 
 54. But see MOY, supra note 50, at § 5:4 (noting the divided opinions about the de-
fensibility of human involvement for patents). 
 55. See id. at 5-15 (―Speaking generally, there is a strong consensus that the patent 
system currently exists to foster the development of applied technology . . . .‖). 
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The flexible, broad definition customary in the United States, while im-
proving the narrow approach, is itself not free from gender perspective crit-
icism.  Despite the flexibility and expansion of the definition, effectively 
including more women inventors, large areas of female activity remain ex-
cluded from the definition of ―invention.‖  The developing legal prece-
dents, which are not guided by a desire to promote equality, have influ-
enced the way in which cases are decided.  Many of the inventions, which 
have been recognized as patentable, are in fields where men are more do-
minant. 
D. The Bilski Case: Broad vs. Narrow Approach 
Even though U.S. courts have expanded the applications protected by pa-
tent law to include fields that are neither technological nor industrial, the 
technological and industrial demands derived from the international defini-
tions that include the phrases, ―in all fields of technology‖ and ―industrial 
application‖56 has recently influenced the traditional American conception 
of patents.
57
  In other words, the law is not totally immune to the recent 
trend.  Some voices explicitly promote the inclusion of machine and tangi-
ble requirements in U.S. patent law and reject Business Methods as being 
patentable.
58
  Coupled with the extensive criticism of U.S. courts for recog-
nizing patentable Business Methods, this has led to a retreat from the 
broader U.S. definition of a patentable invention and an about-face toward 
including a Machine Test as a threshold requirement.  This trend is clearly 
evident in the In re Bilski U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit deci-
                                                          
 56. See Part II – Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellec-
tual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
trips_e/t_agm3_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (stating that the patentable subject 
matter includes any inventions in any technology fields). 
 57. See MOY, supra note 50, at § 5:4 (discussing the existence of judicial excep-
tions that limit the patent law system to matters where technology has been applied); 
Biddinger, supra note 54, at 2524 (providing that traditionally patents were meant to 
protect advancements in technology).  But see Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 264-65 (ex-
plaining that the Congress and American people started to recognize that information 
products are a large part of the economy, appreciate the value of intellectual work, and 
support the creative community producing such work with intellectual property rights); 
Chiappetta, supra note 50, at 182 n.2 (explaining that the United States has recently 
broadened the scope of patentable subject matter such as including business method 
patenting); Porter, supra note 49, at 225 (noting that ―business method patents have 
taken center stage of discussions regarding patentable subject matter‖). 
 58. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm‘n, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359-60 (affirming 
the principle that for a claimed invention to be a patentable subject matter, the inven-
tion must produce a useful, concrete and tangible result); MOY, supra note 55, at § 5:30 
(stating that change in approach to the business methods occurred as a result of them 
being anchored in computer technology); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 43, at 
1156 (arguing that the U.S. patent law, while it is technology-neutral in theory, tends to 
be lenient in granting patents to computer technology, compared to other fields such as 
biotechnology). 
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sion
59
 (the trend was later overturned by the Supreme Court).
60
 
The Bilski case deals with the question of whether or not a Business Me-
thod can be recognized as a patentable invention.  The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit held the narrow opinion.
61
  The ruling was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, which favored a broader approach in relation 
to the EPM definition.
62
  For the purposes of this Article, it should be noted 
that the Bilski decisions, although relevant to the gender divide, did not 
consider gender issues in any way, shape, or form. 
Although the Federal Circuit‘s majority decision was rejected by the Su-
preme Court, we cannot ignore the voices favoring the narrow approach.  
All former instances and almost all of the Federal Circuit judges sought to 
adopt the narrow approach.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court, like the Fed-
eral Circuit, denied the patent because the Business Method in question 
was an unpatentable abstract idea.
63
  Moreover, the Supreme Court did not 
reject the narrow approach totally, ruling that by ―disapproving an exclu-
sive machine-or-transformation test, we by no means foreclose the Federal 
Circuit‘s development of other limiting criteria that further the purposes of 
the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.‖64 
The Federal Circuit‘s decision represents the ―masculine‖ narrow patent 
approach.  The majority opinion held that a claim process is a Patent Eligi-
ble Matter if (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus; or (2) it 
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.
65
  Moreover, 
the majority concluded that this ―machine or transformation test‖ is the sole 
test for determining patent eligibility of a ―process‖ under section 101 of 
the patent law.
66
  The court applied the test and held that the application in 
question was not patent eligible.
67
  The definition of EPM was thereby con-
tracted (until the decision was overturned) by adopting ―masculine‖ thre-
                                                          
 59. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that purported 
transformation of business risks or other abstractions are not physical objects, thus do 
not represent a transformation of an object into a different state, which is required to be 
patentable). 
 60. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010) (ruling that the ‗machine-
or-transformation‘ test is only a factor in determining whether an invention is patenta-
ble). 
 61. See id. (pointing out that the Federal Circuit misinterpreted the machine-or-
transformation test as exclusive or exhaustive). 
 62. See id. at 3229 (explaining that  business methods may be within the patentable 
subject matter according to the Patent Act). 
 63. See id. at 3229-30 (explaining that abstract ideas are not patentable). 
 64. Id. at 3231. 
 65. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the ratio-
nale behind the machine-or-transformation test). 
 66. See id. at 961 (rejecting the ―physical steps‖ test). 
 67. See id. at 963 (holding that business methods cannot meet the test because they 
are not physical objects or substances). 
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shold criteria, such as the use of a ―machine,‖ or the ―transformation‖ test 
that applies only to physical substances and the test requiring a tangible, 
physical object.  For example, in describing the decision‘s criteria for a pa-
tentable invention, Judge Paul R. Michel wrote: 
The machine-or-transformation test is a two-branched inquiry; an appli-
cant may show . . . that his claim is tied to a particular machine, or . . . 
[show] that his claim transforms an article. [A]bstractions cannot meet 
the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are 
not representative of physical objects or substances.‖
68
 
This narrow interpretation is not derived from the language of the law.
69
  
According to the Supreme Court‘s later decision, the law includes a list of 
requirements that can be interpreted as alternative requirements.
70
  Influ-
enced by the global narrowing trend, the Federal Circuit gave precedence 
to certain terms (such as ―machine‖) over others, making ―new and useful 
art‖ subordinate to the ―machine‖ test and interpreting terminology that 
could be considered neutral, such as ―transformation,‖ as including a thre-
shold requirement of ―physical and tangible.‖ 
Other judicial opinions in the decision, both in the majority and in the 
minority (except for Judge Pauline Newman), supported this stance.
71
  For 
example, in a dissenting opinion Judge Haldane Robert Mayer wrote that 
―the patent system is intended to protect and promote advances in science 
and technology . . . .‖72  Further, he claimed that the famous State Street 
and AT&T decisions recognizing business methods as patentable inventions 
should be overruled.
73
  Judge Newman was the only one who disagreed.  In 
her dissenting opinion, Judge Newman wrote that the ―court‘s redefinition 
is contrary to statute and to explicit rulings of the Supreme Court and this 
court.‖74 
Judge Newman did not directly refer to the gender aspect, but her words 
are useful in promoting patent protection for women‘s fields of activity.  
Reading her words in light of principles outlined in this Article leads to a 
renewed understanding of the expansive definition of ―invention‖ against a 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 961-62. 
 69. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (emphasizing that courts should not read into pa-
tent laws limitations and conditions not expressed by the legislature). 
 70. See id. at 3227-28 (explaining that the list of patentable subject matter is 
phrased in the disjunctive). 
 71. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 974 (stating that the need to accommodate technological 
change does not force courts to rewrite the relevant statute as to include human activi-
ties that do not involve machines). 
 72. Id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 73. See id. at 1000-01 (explaining that before State Street was decided, this court 
correctly held that patents were designed to protect technological innovations, not ab-
stract ideas). 
 74. Id. at 977 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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background of gender.  Adopting Judge Newman‘s position in line with 
keeping to the traditional U.S. approach makes it possible to recognize 
women‘s work as eligible for patent protection.  A narrower definition 
would exclude both the inventors of business methods and the women 
creating in non-technical fields such as education and psychology.  Judge 
Newman further explained: 
The court . . . by redefining the word ―process‖ in the patent statute . . . 
exclude[s] all processes that do not transform physical matter or that are 
not performed by machine. The court thus excludes many . . . kinds of 
inventions . . . . The Supreme Court has consistently confirmed the con-
stitutional and legislative purpose of providing a broadly applicable in-
centive to commerce and creativity, through this system of limited exclu-
sivity.
75
 
The Supreme Court, in accordance with Judge Newman‘s dissent, over-
turned the Federal Circuit and ruled in favor of the broader approach, going 
so far as to state that the statute itself acknowledges that there may be a 
business methods patent.
76
  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the 
Federal Circuit‘s interpretation was inconsistent with the plain language of 
the Constitution and the law.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), the term ―process‖ 
means ―process, art or method, and includes the new use of a known 
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.‖77  The 
Supreme Court explained that they are unaware of any ordinary, contempo-
rary, common meaning of ―process‖ that would require it to be tied to a 
machine or transformation of articles.
78
  However, although the Supreme 
Court overturned the Federal Circuit‘s rationale, they affirmed its final de-
cision in rejecting Bilski‘s Business Method as patentable.  The Supreme 
Court concluded that the application was rejected on the basis of unpaten-
tability of abstract ideas.
79
 
This Article highlights the importance of re-examining the definition of 
―invention‖ in patent laws worldwide.  In most countries, the definition of 
―invention‖ emphasizes the elements relating to machines, industry, and 
technology.  In its current form, this definition favors men and fails to re-
flect the contribution of women to human welfare.  One suggestion is to 
                                                          
 75. Id. at 976. 
 76. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3222 (noting that applicable statutory defenses indicate 
that business methods are ―simply one kind of ‗method‘‖). 
 77. See id. at 3225 (explaining that Congress intended to give patent laws a wide 
scope). 
 78. See id. at 3221-22 (noting that the machine-or-transformation test was never 
considered exhaustive or exclusive). 
 79. See id. at 3231 (rejecting the ―machine or transformation test‖ as the sole test 
for determining that a product or a process is patententable, and ruling that the lan-
guage of 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 does not disallow all business methods from being pa-
tented). 
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change the definition of EPM to include inventions created from women‘s 
life experiences in areas such as education, psychology, social work, and 
relevant Business Methods. 
Although the Supreme Court adopts this notion, it is important to note 
that the Federal Circuit ruled otherwise and that movement toward a nar-
rowing approach remains prevalent.  Limiting the definition of EPM by at-
tributing greater importance to technology and industry is effectively 
equivalent to adopting the narrow TRIPS definition and is very undesirable 
from the perspective of gender equality. 
E. Supporting Data: How Many Women Inventors are There?
80
 
Statistical data supports feminist criticism of the narrow EPM definition 
because it reveals the near exclusion of women in a narrow approach patent 
legal system.  To date, only partial statistics are available regarding the 
number of women inventors around the world.
81
  As set forth in this Ar-
ticle, while women inventors are a minority of all inventors in the fields 
examined in this study, they are an especially small minority in countries 
that adopt the narrow approach.
82
 
The Israeli legal system is an adequate example of the connection be-
tween the narrow approach to EPM and the deficit of women inventors.  In 
Israel, the narrow definition of an invention, translated literally from the 
TRIPS agreement prevails: 
Israeli Patent Law, Section 3: 
―Patentable invention‖ is defined as an ―invention, in any field of tech-
nology. . . which is capable of industrial application.‖
83
 
The low number of women inventors in Israel makes a good case study 
                                                          
 80. In this study, ―inventor‖ refers to (independent) women inventors.  The re-
search focuses on the proprietary sense of the words ―woman inventor,‖ and not on de-
scribing the woman inventor working in an invention-rich field.  The words are not ar-
bitrary, they are derived from the central discourse on women‘s exclusion from 
proprietary rights and, therefore, from the main channels that lead to resources, power, 
control, welfare, honor, self-fulfillment, etc.  See generally How Many Women Inven-
tors are There?, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blwomen 
inventors.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
 81. See generally id. (showing that, for the sources do not clarify their use of the 
term ―women inventor,‖ it is likely that they also include women inventors who do own 
property rights to their inventions). 
 82. See Frietsch et al., supra note 17, at 594-95 (stating that during the span of 
2003-2005, the relative contribution of women in patent applications averaged around 
8%, but finding an increase in the number of women inventors in the pharmaceutical 
and bio-technology fields); Patricia Carter-Ives, Patent and Trademark Innovations of 
Black Americans and Women, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC‘Y 108, 113-14 (1980) (noting a 1935 
study, which indicated that women received approximately 15,000 of 2,100,000 issued 
patents); Thomas Frey, A Study of Women Inventors, FUTURISTSPEAKER.COM (Aug. 4, 
2008), http://www.futuristspeaker.com/2008/08/a-study-of-women-inventors/ (report-
ing that in 2002, 10.9% of all patents were named with women inventors). 
 83. Patent Law, 5727-1976 (Isr.). 
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because Israel has a well-developed patent industry and ranks highly in 
terms of the number of patents granted per capita.
84
 
Research done for a previous study found that in 2000-2005,
85
 in Israel,
86
 
the number of Israeli women inventors who applied for patents in Israel 
was only 1.9% out of all applicants (including corporations).
87
  The ratio of 
female inventors to male inventors, excluding the corporate group,
88
 was 
5.95%
89
 during the same period.  To look at the figures in a different light, 
in thirty-six out of the sixty months examined, not one single woman ap-
plied for a patent, as the owner of its rights.  In the remaining months, only 
a few (one to three) women inventors, who have property rights over the 
patent, submitted applications that were accepted. 
Comparing Israel‘s statistics with the partial data available from the 
United States, which uses a broader interpretation approach to EPM, the 
U.S. clearly shows a significantly higher percentage (more than double) of 
women inventors.
90
 
To address the technological industries in particular, research published 
in 2010 on women inventors in nanotechnology showed that women en-
compassed 11.2% of all inventors in this field.  Furthermore, the percen-
tage of patents granted to entire research teams that included a minimum of 
one female inventor was 16.7%.
91
 
The Patent Statistics Reports section of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTMT) website compiles reports based on several categories
92
 in-
                                                          
 84. The International Patent System in 2008, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/activity/pct_2008.html#P219_13270 (last visited Oct. 20, 
2010). 
 85. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 24, at 359 (studying applications that were re-
ceived and accepted by the Israel Patent Office during a defined period, based on data 
published in the Patent and Trademark Record). 
 86. See id. (explaining that only patent applications that Israelis filed with the 
Israeli Patent Office are included). 
 87. See id. at 357-59 (looking at applications which were submitted by the owner 
of its rights). 
 88. See id. at 359 (including commercial and other organizations, such as hospitals 
and universities or related corporations that filed patent applications in their names, 
which were accepted in Israel at the time). 
 89. See id. at 357 (providing research showing that employee women inventors 
generally work as part of a team). 
 90. See How Many Women Inventors Are There?, supra note 80 (discussing the 
first female American patent holder and estimating that in the United States, approx-
imately 20% of all inventors are female); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., 
DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, PATENT COUNTS BY CLASS BY YEAR (2009), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/cbcby.htm#PartA1-1 (supplying only partial data because 
the U.S. Patent Office does not ask applicants to identify themselves by gender). 
 91. See Meng, supra note 16, at 12 (explaining that the percentage of patents 
granted to male research teams is twice as large). 
 92. See Calendar Year Patent Statistics (January 1 to December 31) General Pa-
tent Statistics Reports Available for Viewing, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
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cluding one statistical report concerning women inventors.
93
  The report 
states that the ―percentage of patents granted within ownership category 
which have at least one women inventor, American origin, was more than 
10% in 1998.‖94  The percentage today should be higher because the num-
ber of women inventors increased five-fold in the twenty years covered by 
the study.
95
  Another study reported approximately 20% women inven-
tors.
96
 
There is also data showing that the percentage of female inventors is 
higher in areas of non-classical technology, such as biology, than in me-
chanical and electronic fields.
97
 
U.S. origin utility patents pertaining to chemical technologies have the 
highest percentage of women.
98
  Utility patents have been roughly divided 
into chemical, electrical and mechanical technology categories based on 
their primary or ―original‖ classification within the U.S. Patent Classifica-
tion System (USPCS).
99
  A study conducted on this basis found that patents 
pertaining to chemical technologies have the highest rate of participation 
by women inventors:
100
 ―[N]early half of the U.S. origin woman-inventor 
patents issued during the 1977 to 1996 period pertain to chemical technolo-
gies, while 36.2 percent pertain to mechanical technologies, and only 14.3 
percent pertain to electrical technologies.‖101  The percentage of U.S. origin 
patents compares somewhat positively with the percentages for France and 
Sweden.
102
 
When sorted by category, a review of the number of applications submit-
                                                          
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm#by_invt (last visited Oct. 
20, 2010) (including studies titled Patent Counts by Class and Year, Independent In-
ventors, and Prolific Inventors Receiving Utility Patents, 1988-1997). 
 93. See generally U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., BUTTONS 
TO BIOTECH: U.S. PATENTING BY WOMEN, 1977 TO 1996 (1999) [hereinafter BUTTONS 
TO BIOTECH], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/wom 
98.pdf (showing ownership of U.S. origin woman-inventor patents from 1977 to 1998). 
 94. See id. at Appendix Table 4-1 (showing that in 1998, only 10.8 percent of U.S. 
patents inventors were received by U.S.-resident women). 
 95. See id. at 8 (completing the study in 1996). 
 96. See How Many Women Inventors are There?, supra note 80 (distinguishing un-
clearly between independent inventors and women employee-inventors). 
 97. See BUTTONS TO BIOTECH, supra note 93, at 11, figure 4 (separating patents 
into categories of utility, design, plant, and other). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. (acknowledging that less than 0.1 percent of patents are currently not 
classified under this method). 
 100. See id. at 12 (depicting the study‘s findings concerning the annual share of U.S. 
Origin Patents which have a women inventor, by technology). 
 101. See id at 11-13, figure 5 (demonstrating that the categories with the lowest per-
centage of woman-inventor patents are brakes, fluid-pressure and analogous brake sys-
tems, and joints and connections, each at zero percent). 
 102. Id. at 8. 
22
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss3/5
RAVID 3/12/11 9/1/2011  6:28 PM 
2011] GENDER ANALYSIS OF PATENT LAW 873 
ted for patents also support the connection between the narrow vs. broad 
approach and its effects on women.  In countries where the definition of a 
patentable invention includes an industrial component, applications submit-
ted are primarily in technological-industrial fields including electronics, 
mechanics, computers, communications, and industrial chemistry—all 
areas where men reign dominant.  In contrast, in the United States‘ broader 
regime, it can be seen that there are ―softer‖ fields such as biochemistry, 
biology, and organic elements with a more significant female presence.
103
  
It is clear that this higher percentage of female inventors cannot be main-
tained if the definition of a patent narrows the focus to machine-
technological-industrial elements. 
F. The Case for Expanding the Definition of Patentable Invention 
Recognition of general legal patent protection for ―female‖ innovations 
will encourage progress and development in ―female‖ fields and subse-
quently increased efficiency by organizing untapped female markets.  This 
recognition will lead to the commercialization of additional activities in 
those fields by encouraging smaller players in the market to create and ge-
nerating a climate of accessibility that stimulates more women to invent.  
The broadened protection will also act to foster cooperation between sec-
tors with different gender characteristics.  The long-term result will be an 
improvement and enrichment of work accomplished by women inventors 
available to the public. 
Applying the globally prevalent rationale of promoting welfare only to 
technological inventions discriminates against a majority of women who 
are responsible for the welfare achieved through inventions in other non-
technical and ―non-machine‖ fields.104  Increasing patent protection is the 
                                                          
 103. See BUTTONS TO BIOTECH, supra note 93, at 13 (―The three classes of technolo-
gy having the highest share of woman-inventor patent grants in 1996 are (1) Chemistry: 
Natural Resins or Derivatives; Peptides or Proteins; Lignins or Reaction Products 
Thereof  (27.8  percent); (2) Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology (26.4 
percent); and (3) Organic Compounds, Class 548 (26.1 percent).‖); see also ISRAEL 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL STATISTIC INFORMATION ON THE PATENT, DESIGN AND 
TRADEMARK ACTIVITIES: PATENT APPLICATIONS SORTED BY AREA YEAR 2004 (June 7, 
2004), available at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/EA739A38-EFCD-413C-
9A7B-A9D113C1492B/0/PTAPPAREA2004.bmp (providing statistics for seven cate-
gories of Israeli patent applications). 
 104. See MOY, supra note 50, at § 5:8 (discussing the limitations of the traditional 
paradigm that defines patent-law).  See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 263-64 
(summarizing recent changes in intellectual property law); Chiappetta, supra note 43, 
at 182-83 (arguing for the reassessment of normative differences implicit in TRIPS); 
Porter, supra note 49, at 225-26 (theorizing that the American approach to business 
method patents will obstruct uniformity with the world patent system).  Criticism of the 
patent system and its expansion claims that patent protection hampers development and 
free competition of individuals and companies.  See Biddinger, supra note 54, at 2523-
26 (arguing against the patentability of business methods); Andrew R. Sommer, 
Trouble on the Commons: A Lockean Justification for Patent Law Harmonization, 87 J. 
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best legal way to protect women‘s inventions effectively and to bring them 
to the same level as men.  By going through alternative routes, i.e., suggest-
ing other types of protection for women‘s activity, the level of protection 
would not be the same as it would for a patent.  Even if copyright protec-
tion proves coextensive (and has its own benefit as it lasts longer), the ap-
plication of different type of protections to different genders will lead to the 
separate and unequal protection to women.
105
 
The broadened definition of an invention needs to be decided cautiously.  
Inventions that are protected by patent law give their inventors significant 
and exclusive rights.  The free use of patents deprives the public, during the 
term of exclusivity, and requires them to request a license and pay royalties 
in order to use the invention.  The result, if not carefully balanced, might be 
paradoxical: the more we expand the definition of Eligible Patent Matter—
to further women‘s cause—the more we might limit the development of the 
field we want to advance.
106
 
It cannot be denied that moving the value of gender equality from the 
margins of patent discourse to the center will have its price, but the proper 
balance can be found between achieving real targets on the path to equality 
in the field of inventions and the price incurred for that achievement.  By 
addressing and rehabilitating the current state of patent law with caution 
and working to balance the needs of male and female inventors and the 
rights of the public, a better, more gender-equal balancing point will be 
achieved; one that, unlike the current state, serves everybody‘s interests 
equally. 
The conclusion cannot be avoided: perpetuating the current situation and 
a definition of EPM that serves as beneficial only to one gender is inappro-
priate.  The present state of patent law in many countries, by its definition, 
discriminates against women, prevents the upward mobility of women, and 
exacts a heavy social and economic price.  The existing definition serves to 
create and uphold an ever-growing male elite with economic power while 
preventing growth and development of other non-technological fields that 
are important to promoting welfare in society today. 
                                                          
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 141, 142 (2005) (arguing that any expansion of patent 
protection is detrimental to the public).  But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 38, at 
1205-06 (asserting that patent law should be more flexible, so as to include different 
inventions). 
 105. See Nicholas A. Smith, Note, Business Method Patents and Their Limits: Justi-
fications, History, and the Emergence of a Claim Construction Jurisprudence, 9 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 171, 184-85 (2002) (discussing the significance of dispa-
rate patent law approaches to business method). 
 106. Furthermore, a balance must be found otherwise it might become impossible to 
enforce overbroad monopolistic rights to protect these inventions because they are used 
so extensively in many areas of life.  In the United States, such criticisms have emerged 
in protest of expanding patent protection to include business methods. 
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Only with the return of an egalitarian starting point will the current se-
gregation between women‘s and men‘s occupations be understood, the im-
portance of equality and women‘s contributions be internalized, and the 
ability to formulate a more egalitarian definition of invention be possible. 
G. Relevant Findings 
The decision to define ―invention‖ in a technological-industrial manner, 
as done in many countries, reflects a desire to promote welfare,
107
 innova-
tion, and knowledge, primarily vis-à-vis technological and industrial inven-
tions and patents.
108
  This criterion, however, is androcentric.  When it was 
―decided‖ to use these industrial terms as part of the definition of a protect-
able patent, it was known that the technological-industrial fields were (and 
are) primarily controlled by men.  By using a perspective based on a male 
model, whether intentionally or otherwise, a decision with widespread and 
international effects was made to adopt a ―masculine‖ characteristic as the 
threshold condition for the legal creation of a patent. 
Cultural feminism argues the necessity of considering the differences in 
women‘s contributions to society and the inventing process and the need to 
value them equally.  Therefore, taking a critical look at current threshold 
requirements means legal tests must be established using feminine traits in 
addition to the already recognized masculine tests (innate or acquired, natu-
ral or attributed) and women must be granted the rights that, in this case, 
originate in patent law. 
Supporters of liberal equality respond that the definitions of ―invention‖ 
are open to all genders and represent an equal opportunity to all who wish 
to participate; as such, women can integrate into technological systems and 
create inventions.  However, this claim fails to address the crux of the prob-
lem leading to the exclusion of women: the threshold and masculine criteria 
that serve as the foundation of the definition of patents. 
According to the radical feminist approach, the concept of equality does 
not reflect two-sided equality between the sexes.  The claims of so-called 
equality are merely unidirectional.  The meaning of ―equal‖ amounts to 
―equal to a man.‖  Women are compared to men and not the opposite.  In 
order for women to be granted resources and rights, they need to prove, as 
a threshold condition, that they have ―masculine‖ characteristics and, there-
                                                          
 107. See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and 
The Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2003) (indicating how legal 
tools are used to advance economic welfare). 
 108. Compare id. (addressing the use of patent law as a tool to promote the quantity 
and quality of innovative products and hence enrich the welfare of the public), with  
Sarnoff, supra note 25, at 15-17 (suggesting that the exclusion of ―traditional‖ wom-
en‘s work from patentable categories has benefitted society by contributing to a robust 
public domain). 
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fore, are entitled to the benefits granted to the male group.  The liberal so-
called equal opportunity does not consider the idea that women have their 
own standards.  Instead, women are effectively made to ask for rights that 
they deserve from the beginning.
109
 
Even if one remains unconvinced that the definition of a patent excludes 
women inventors, the ideas discussed in this Article and the same rationale 
can be applied to current statistics (discussed supra) to encourage equality 
where equal footing has yet to be found.  As explained above, the law 
serves to create and perpetuate social gaps, but it also has the ability to 
close them.  Therefore, it is still possible to use legal definitions to correct 
the gaps, even if their origin is unidentified.  The solution, according to cul-
tural feminist theory, is to ―rewrite‖ the criteria to include women‘s expe-
riences and move toward granting them equal value.  Placing gender-
equality as a value in the center of legal discourse will lead to more egalita-
rian criteria that also reflect the feminine voice.  After making this change, 
it will be possible to accommodate patent applications in new categories, 
such as social, educational, psychological, and familial inventions, along-
side the familiar categories of electronics, mechanics, and computers. 
The exclusion of women transmits an antidemocratic message.  Ob-
stacles keeping women at a distance from potential access to resources and 
power are an impediment on the way to achieving distributional justice.  
Exclusion transmits a stereotypical and un-educational message that places 
women in a disadvantaged position.  Furthermore, exclusion leads to eco-
nomic inefficiency by discouraging the advancement of entire fields and 
not taking maximum advantage of human potential. 
The integration of a new voice requires finding new words and creating 
new methods.
110
  Additional research is required in order to identify fields 
that can be included in the definitions of invention; however, opening the 
―opportunity gate‖ to women inventors by changing the definitions to more 
egalitarian ones is only the first stage.  Once the definitions are rewritten, 
women will be occupied with inventing, whether in the technological and 
industrial fields prevalent today or in one of the other occupational areas 
that will be included in the new legal definitions of ―invention‖ and ―inven-
tor,‖ as proposed in this Article.  Nevertheless, by changing the defined 
terms alone, it is doubtful that these women will be awarded complete 
property rights in their inventions.  There is a second and essential stage 
necessary to women‘s progress, which is examining the mechanisms that 
                                                          
 109. See MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, supra note 6, at 32-35 (noting 
that there are two alternate paths to equality for women: either be the same as men or 
be different from men). 
 110. See GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 1-4 (noting that there is a disparity between 
women‘s experience and representation of human development in psychological and 
literary texts, which has generally evinced a problem in women‘s development). 
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ensure fair rights to women who develop inventions (such as, addressing 
the issue of who is considered an ―inventor‖ for the purposes of allocating 
property rights).  This mechanism is discussed separately in a subsequent 
article. 
III. RETHINKING EPM: CONCLUSIONS 
A. Is Patent Law Gender Blind? 
Taking into consideration the insignificant number of women inventors, 
the interesting question arises: how did relevant international law (influen-
cing many legal systems) develop as if there are no women? 
One of the explanations for the creation of legal mechanisms that ex-
clude women from many fields is the use of androcentric criteria,
111
 mean-
ing those rules and definitions are built on the basis of a masculine model.  
Androcentric rules are built too narrowly and often exclude women‘s expe-
rience.  The use of these criteria inevitably results in a model that is not 
suited to women and perpetuates their exclusion from the distribution of 
resources and other benefits that the model promotes. 
The hurdles that must be overcome before putting reforms into place are 
lofty.  Exposing the androcentric structures is not simple.  Historically, in-
dustrial intellectual property protection (patents) was distinguished from 
the cultural intellectual property protection (copyright).  Patent law was es-
tablished to distinguish industrial, scientific, and conceptual discoveries 
from cultural creations.
112
  The gender-bias is part of the historically cate-
gorization.  Moreover, for centuries, both men and women have interna-
lized the idea that these ideals are the appropriate standard of measure and 
only justifiable criteria.  Further, the only noticeable testimony to the need 
for a critical examination of the principles is the resulting gender segrega-
tion and resultant discrimination.  The causal relationship between the prin-
ciples and the discriminatory result is not always clear.  The absence of 
negative intent, the lack of evidence for a masculine ―conspiracy‖ and other 
values (advancement of science, technology, and economic welfare) that 
justify the principles all hamper critical examination of the status quo.  Fi-
nally, rescinding principles that are deeply rooted in the legal and economic 
                                                          
 111. See id. at 62-63 (suggesting that society‘s hierarchical and gender based struc-
ture negatively impacts one‘s conception of the self); SANDRA LIPSITZ-BEM, THE 
LENSES OF GENDER-TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY 73-79 (1993) 
(chronicling recent Supreme Court jurisprudence); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 106-26 
(1979) (comparing two different theories concerning gender discrimination in the 
American legal system). 
 112. See Sarnoff, supra note 25, at 38 (explaining that after the revolutionary law, 
there was an effort to encourage the development of literature through copyright law). 
27
Yanisky-Ravid: Eligible Patent Matter—Gender Analysis of Patent Law: Internation
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
RAVID 3/12/11 9/1/2011  6:28 PM 
878 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 19:3 
system, which have become foundation stones for the entire system over 
the years, is considered impossible or unjustifiable. 
Taking all this into account, it is apparent that fighting against discrimi-
nation barriers has its cost.  In addressing the gender issues highlighted in 
this Article, policy makers will have to decide, after considering the gender 
aspects explicitly as an equal factor, whether they are willing to pay this 
cost.
113
 
As set forth above, among the various suspect legal principles, special at-
tention should be paid to the definitions used.  Definitions by their very na-
ture are critical guardians with the political power to determine who is 
permitted to enter a certain field (and benefit from its distributions).  The 
definitions at a threshold level determine who remains outside that field.  
From this perspective, the definitions are even more important than the 
other principles of distribution that apply to those who pass the definitions‘ 
filter. 
This Article seeks to question the framework of discourse about intellec-
tual property as lacking the important discussion focused on the imbalance 
between genders, the reasons for that imbalance and the promotion of 
gender equality.  The Article relates to the laws of invention as a part of the 
greater rubric of property law. 
Research focusing on the distribution of power that emerges from prop-
erty ownership relates to intellectual property law including patent law as 
part of the comprehensive set.  The main purpose of this Article is to draw 
attention to existing problems because, without the explicit centralized rec-
ognition that the interpretation of property is a factor for promoting gender 
equality, the legal-property discourse will continue to exclude women. 
The dissonance between property laws and the principal of equality is 
problematic.  The solution is found in a new and different perspective on 
intellectual property law—considering the legal mechanisms in place in the 
context of gender as central to the discourse.  Incorporation of equality dis-
course in the analysis of intellectual property laws will lead to the examina-
tion of the issue in the light of the following important questions: Are the 
principles used for achieving intellectual property applied equally to men 
and women?  Do the definitions of intellectual property exclude women 
from their application?  What changes should be made in light of aware-
ness of the principles of equality as they impact property discourse from its 
center rather than the margins?
114
 
                                                          
 113. Policy makers should consider the problem resulting from changing the patent 
system in the effort to provide more fair and equal treatment to women and other 
groups. 
 114. See Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
611, 637-41, 711-14 (1987) (elaborating on the free market model and the problems 
with free market assumptions). 
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While this Article focuses on the plight of women inventors, the legal 
principles exclude not only women from property rights in their inventions 
and patents, but also other groups.
115
  In other words, the same principles 
which discriminate against women, also discriminate against other groups.  
The solutions for all types of exclusion from patent rights can be similar.  
Therefore, the discussion of women‘s exclusion will likely contribute to 
dealing with the exclusion of other groups from the field of inventions.  
The goal of this Article was inspired by Professor Gilligan‘s voice: ―My 
goal is to expand the understanding of human development by using the 
group left out in the construction of theory to call attention to what is miss-
ing in its account.‖116 
B. Changing Existing Legal Structures 
The legitimacy of the current definition of an ―invention‖ and who is an 
―inventor‖ should be reconsidered from the perspective of the human 
progress, which is inherent in the definition itself.  The definitions should 
be closely examined on the basis as to what extent the narrow definitions 
eliminate the potential contributions of women. 
The relevant definitions need to be changed via international treaties be-
cause the definition of ―invention‖ is derived from the definition in the 
TRIPS Agreement and other international treaties.  Further, international 
recognition of the need for gender equality is a global issue.  As noted, the 
definition of invention is neither static nor unchangeable; it has been 
changed in the past and is likely to change in the future on both interna-
tional and local levels.  Rethinking what is considered EPM in the United 
States is also important.  The discourse between the Supreme Court and 
other courts, as discussed above, reveals different voices that cannot be ig-
nored.  The U.S. Legislature and Supreme Court should consider gender as 
a main factor as they reshape relevant definitions.
117
 
                                                          
 115. Women are a majority of the population.  Advancing women in the field of in-
vention as an international strategy is, first and foremost, a national, economic interest 
because of the desire to enrich and advance the patent field.  See H. Anne Kelly, A 
Woman’s Place: Women’s Emerging Role in Technology, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC‘Y 412, 413 (―America‘s future will depend heavily upon the creative capacity 
of women.‖).  See generally European Comm‘n Directorate-Gen. for Research, She 
Figures 2003: Women and Science Statistics and Indicators, Eur. 20733 (2003) (stating 
results of a methodological study concerning the entry of women into scientific fields 
in Europe); Carter-Ives, supra note 88, at 108 (discussing the contribution of black 
women in American patent and trademark innovation). 
 116. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 3-4. 
 117. See Sarnoff, supra note 25, at 108-09 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence 
concerning the novelty and obviousness doctrines).  Further research could inquire into 
relationship between each component of the EPM demands and its discriminatory ef-
fect.  The obviousness doctrine may have greater gender-discriminatory effects than a 
simple novelty doctrine. 
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C. Summary 
The fact that a woman, Madame Curie, won the Nobel Prize—in physics 
in 1903 and in chemistry in 1911—may mislead the public from the dismal 
reality of women‘s true standing in the world of intellectual property.  The 
percentage of women inventors is minuscule.  Marie Curie‘s success is an 
exception to the norm. 
The structures in place that perpetuate the division of gender roles lead 
to unacceptable outcomes.  The historical and ongoing exclusion of women 
from recognition in the inventing process is not coincidental; their obscuri-
ty serves to distance women from power, resources, and status.  Closer ex-
amination of the problem reveals that it need not be everlasting.  The bias 
can be corrected through both legal as well as social changes.  We should 
not forget that the legal system is the creation of humankind and is intended 
to serve everyone under its auspices. 
This Article offers a basis for reform that would promote gender equality 
in the laws of invention.  In the first stage, the broad definition as adopted 
by the U.S. (in contrast to the narrow international definition) should be 
adopted on an international level and by national legal systems.  As such, 
the main purpose of this study is to begin a dialogue and to include gender 
as a legitimate consideration when shaping legal intellectual property prin-
ciples.  This is true also in relation to the U.S. patent legal system. 
Integration of feminist insights about legally created hierarchical struc-
tures and the importance of integrating the ―other voice‖ into legal-property 
arrangements will, if considered, lead to more egalitarian structures.  Of 
course, change cannot be expected to occur immediately nor can suggested 
changes provide a solution for the current generation of women inventors 
who find themselves tied to professions that lack prestige and proper com-
pensation.  The suggested changes can begin to ensure that future genera-
tions of women do not have to suffer the same inequalities.  In an era of 
growing awareness of equality between the sexes, as women‘s slowly 
changing self-perception allows them to recognize their own strengths, the 
time is ripe to reconsider and amend the law reflect these changes. 
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